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BISEXUAL JURISPRUDENCE: A TRIPOLAR
APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY
HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACLALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER
AMERICAN LAW. By Ruth Colker. New York: New York University
Press, 1996. 300 Pages.
Rachel I-faynes
Current law and society are based on bipolar categories: black or
white; gay or straight; male or female; able or disabled. These bipolar
categories force individuals to choose one category and thereby create
a seemingly either/or based identity: you are either black or white; gay
or straight; male or female; able or disabled. Bipolar categories under-
score the reality of the varied compositions that create an individual's
identity. Critics of bipolar categories have called for their restructuring
in the hopes of creating more inclusive categories that reflect people's
true identities.
One such critic of bipolar categories is Ruth Colker. Colker's lat-
est book, Hybrid: Bisexuals, Multiracials, and Other Misfits Under
American Law,' calls for changing current legal categories. Central to
Colker's book is the term "hybrid," which Colker uses as a description
of people who lie between bipolar legal categories-such as bisexuals,
transsexuals, and people with multiracial backgrounds. Colker seeks
to incorporate human hybrids into the legal world by improving and
adding to existing legal categories.
While Colker's book begins a critique of bipolar categories and
their legal and social implications, it falls short of positing a transfor-
mative reconstruction of existing bipolar categories. Colker's suggestion
of adding new and improved legal categories ignores the ramifications
* J.D., expected 1999, City University of New York School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Ruthann Robson for her insight, encouragement, and commitment. I
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1. Rum COLKER, HYBRID: BIsExuALs, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER
AMERICAN LAW (1996).
2. "Human hybrids, however, are not produced by artificial technology or genetic mix-
ing, but by law and society. When the law creates such bipolar categories as
homosexual and heterosexual, white and black, able-bodied and disabled, it leaves a
gap between categories. These hybrids befuddle courts, because the existing categories
do not fit them. The time has come to incorporate human hybrids into the legal
world." COLKER, supra note 1, at xii.
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of adding new categories to a fundamentally flawed system. The addi-
tion of a third category could potentially create a tripolar system that
is no more representative or liberating than the present bipolar system.
Part I of this Review will briefly assess the principal arguments in
Colker's book. In Part II, Colker's book will be situated within the
larger currents of the discussion concerning bisexuality and the argu-
ments for a bisexual jurisprudence. Part III critiques Colker's concept
of a bisexual jurisprudence as applied to sexual hybrids from the
standpoint of an identity, as well as a legal, skeptic.' Part IV will
sketch out some important implications for the advancement of a bi-
sexual jurisprudence as well as question the need for a bisexual
jurisprudence. This review concludes that the addition of a bisexual
jurisprudence, like the one Colker has fashioned in her book, is nei-
ther transformative nor liberating for individuals with varied
identities. Instead, the idea of a pansensual jurisprudence that seeks to
deconstruct existing identity categories, as opposed to adding new
categories, is a more radical and potentially transformative vision of
our current legal and social system.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF Hybrid
The defining feature of Hybrid is Colker's repeated argument that
legal categories are indispensable, and that we should consider how
such categories can be improved and not destroyed. Colker argues that
improved categories would help marginalized individuals overcome
subordination through the development of positive self-identities as
well as through ameliorative programs, like affirmative action, that are
more representative of multiple identities.4 Her agenda is twofold:
Colker aims to critique existing categorization schemes while offering
constructive categorization schemes for the future. Colker advances
her critique through seven chapters treating bi jurisprudence, sexual
orientation, gender, race, disability, bipolar injustice, and the United
States Census, respectively. Colker's categorical critique of various
hybrid legal categories demonstrates how law based on a bipolar
3. I use the term "identity skeptic" to refer to thinkers who are critical of conventional
identity categories and adopt legal approaches to remedy discrimination based on
those categories. "Legal skeptics" favor cultural remedies and are skeptical of the effi-
cacy of solutions which are grounded in legal rather than cultural change.
4. See COLER, supra note 1, at 6.
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framework denigrates hybrids and renders them invisible. Colker's
categorical critique does not extend to critical reflection on the
amendments she proposes.
Colker's attempts to reform are informed by a belief that categories
have value as a form of self-identity. Colker argues that living in a soci-
ety which subordinates people based on their minority status makes it
imperative to have labels that are part of a positive self-identity.5
Colker also believes categories are crucial for political and instrumen-
tal purposes because they can be refined to aid ameliorative programs
in creating social equality.6 However, by focusing on improving ex-
isting categorical systems, Colker sacrifices the liberatory agenda of
freeing current legal nofions of identity and instead perpetuates the
current legal system.
Colker's chapters on the legal status of bisexuals establish her
claim that a bi perspective is necessary. In chapter two of Tlybrid,
Colker argues that general ignorance surrounding bisexuality allows
society to perpetuate the stereotype of sexuality as rigidly dichotomous
rather than existing along a fluid spectrum.7 Bisexuality, in theory and
in practice, could go beyond focusing on an individual's sexual con-
duct toward an attempt to understand the feelings motivating such
conduct. Since conduct is outwardly visible, people would need to
verbalize their feelings regarding sexuality so that society would be
able to move beyond a "narrow, noncontextual, and rigid under-
standing of sexuality."8 In addition to breaking dichotomous sexuality
conceptions through the verbalization of feelings, a bi perspective
would also afford an opportunity for individuals, and society, to find
an organizing principle other than biological sex to define sexual at-
tractiveness. 9 Bisexuality, in Colker's assessment, disconnects gender
and sexual preference, thereby freeing sexual desire of gender.
5. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 7.
6. See CoLKER, supra note 1, at 7.
7. See COLER, supra note 1, at 30.
8. CoLKER, supra note 1, at 30.
9. See COLER, supra note 1, at 30 (quoting MARTIN S. WEINBERG ET AL., DUAL AT-
TRACTION: UNDERSTANDING BisJxuAiTy 27-29 (1994)). In the passage to which
Colker refers, Weinberg reports, "instead of organizing their sexuality in terms of the
traditional gender schema, bisexuals do so in terms of an 'open gender schema,' a per-
spective that disconnects gender and sexual preference, making the direction of sexual
desire (toward the same or opposite sex) independent of a person's own gender
(whether a man or a woman)."
1999]
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Choosing a bi perspective would enable people to "choose not to
choose" instead of being forced into choosing an existing static and
bipolar category. Colker cautions, however, that "choosing not to
choose" still embraces the category of bisexuality, which may not fully
reflect the content of an individual's sexuality. To render an individual's
sexuality fully visible, Colker suggests storytelling, which would reflect
an individual's changing life experiences in ways that static categories
cannot. Where it is possible, in addition to or instead of categoriza-
tion, Colker emphasizes the importance of storytelling.' 0
The inclusion of a bi perspective serves the two purposes of
Colker's constructive categorical schemes. The naming of bisexuality
serves her first purpose of positive self-identity. A bi perspective would
broaden people's understanding of human sexual experiences through
the acknowledgment of the existence of a fluid spectrum rather than
rigid bipolar categories. The bi perspective, when applied to the sec-
ond purpose of improving ameliorative programs, may encourage the
intracategorical investigation of identity categories and the construc-
tion of bipolar injustice in society." Colker cautions, however, that
10. Colker suggests that storytelling would make individuals who lie between sexual cate-
gories more visible and could reflect an individual's changing life experiences in ways
that a category could not. However, because Colker finds categories useful for con-
structive purposes, storytelling should be used to supplement, not replace, categories.
See COLKER, supra note 1, at 19-20.
11. Colker has stated:
In applying a bi perspective to race, I have asked myself why critical race
theorists have not tended to ask the intrasection questions that are central
to my perspective as a bisexual. The answer, I believe, depends upon the
difference between the constructions of our sexual orientation and our race.
One of the first components of our identity is race: are we African-
American? Caucasian? Asian-American? We consider it to be a given, an
immutable fact. The significance of that racial identity may differ but it is
something we 'know' like most of us 'know' our gender. Our sexual orien-
tation is something that we discover as we grow older. In particular, people
who have come to identify with a minority sexual identity have had to
grapple with the recognition that they have moved away from the expected
category, heterosexuality, to another category such as homosexuality or bi-
sexuality. Intracategorical movement is therefore a typical experience for
people who are members of a minority sexual-orientation category but is
not a typical experience for people who are members of a minority racial
category.
COLKER, supra note 1, at 37-38.
Colker goes on to discuss how a bi perspective may enhance our understanding
of race through the application of an intracategorical investigation, which would look
at whether or not individuals of certain races belong in a monoracial category or a
[Vol. 5:229
BISEXUAL JURISPRUDENCE
the implications of a bi perspective on distinctly different categories,
like race and disability, will vary from one to the other. Because of the
varied implications of an applied bi perspective, the need to be atten-
tive to context is crucial.
12
Having raised the argument that a bi perspective is necessary,
Colker explores the implications of such a perspective in the varied
contexts of sexual orientation, gender, race, disability, bipolar injus-
tice, and United States Census policies. The chapters discussing
transsexuality and the current controversy involving the United States
Census present a window into the theory behind applying a bi per-
spective to hybrid categories. Although the categories of transsexuality
and the United States Census are not wholly representative of the
contents of Colker's book, they do present provocative and compel-
ling applications of a bisexual theory.
In her third chapter, Colker considers a bi perspective on trans-
sexuality and gender hybrids. Gender hybrids challenge the belief that
biology is destiny by playing with "mother nature" or by questioning
gender roles assigned to each biological sex.'3 Although society re-
presses gender hybrids, they exist in the forms of lesbians, gay men,
bisexuals, transsexuals, and transvestites. 4 The price for being a gender
hybrid can be the loss of child custody, discharge from employment,
and even imprisonment.'5
multiracial category. "It is essential that a bi perspective investigate sexual orientation,
gender, race, and disability to provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the
construction of bipolar injustice in our society." CoLKER, supra note 1, at 38.
12. Colker emphasizes attention to context because the implications of a bi perspective
are not "monolithic." "A bi perspective on sexual orientation and gender may be very
different from a bi perspective on race or disability." Individuals identifying as bisex-
ual will generally be making statements about their feelings or actions towards
another individual. Rarely will a bisexual identity reflect a statement about his or her
discernible physical appearance or family history. Similarly, applying a bi perspective
to gender will usually reflect a statement about feelings, attitudes, or actions. In con-
trast, applying a bi perspective to race can be about identity or about one's ancestry.
COLKER, supra note 1, at 33-34.
13. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 91.
14. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 87.
15. Colker uses the recent Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995), to illustrate
how the hybridization of gender can result in gay and lesbian parents losing their
children. In Bottoms, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that Sharon Bottoms was not
fit to mother her son because of her identity, and status, as a lesbian. Colker states the
decision was a form of "gender policing" where the Court did not approve of Sharon
Bottoms teaching her son to call her female lover, April Wade, "da da." Colker
1999]
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Colker uses the case of Karen Frances Ulane to illustrate the diffi-
culty of existing as a gender hybrid in a bipolar society.' 6 Ulane, a
pilot for Eastern Airlines, took a leave of absence to undergo sex reas-
signment surgery. Eastern Airlines, unaware of her transsexuality until
after her surgery, discharged Ulane who subsequently brought suit
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."7 Although the trial
court found in favor of Ulane, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, finding that Eastern Airlines discriminated against Ulane
because she was a transsexual, and not because she was a female."
Courts have refused to protect individuals who fail to dress in
accordance with socially correct notions of how "men" and "women"
dress. Colker argues that Title VII should recognize discrimination on
the basis of appearance and clothing as covered by the statute. Rules
that require women to wear skirts and men to wear pants force
individuals to conform to rigid gendered standards. 9 Forbidding
individuals to cross-dress serves in two ways to gender police socially
constructed rules regarding appearance for men and women. First,
gender policing promotes a bipolar understanding of what is
appropriate attire for men and women. Women look "appropriate"
when they wear a skirt, pantyhose, and makeup. Men look
"appropriate" when they wear pants, a tie, and no makeup.20 Second,
hypothesizes that if April were "Adam," the custody battle would probably have been
resolved in Sharon Bottoms' favor. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 92.
16. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
17. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082.
18. See Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087. Colker discusses many more cases similar to Ulane's to
show that courts in these cases refused to require employers to accommodate trans-
sexuals. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that a male to female transsexual who is fired for wearing female at-
tire to work is not protected by gender discrimination laws); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen and Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that a transsexual em-
ployee is not protected from employment discrimination under Tide VII); Sommers
v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983) (holding that a trans-
sexual is not protected against employment discrimination under Title VII or state
anti-discrimination law on the grounds of gender and disability); Doe v. Boeing Co.,
846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993) (holding that an employer has no duty to reasonably ac-
commodate an employee's request to dress in female attire when that employee is a
male-to-female transsexual awaiting genital reassignment surgery). See COLKOR, supra
note 1, at 105-06.
19. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 109.
20. Colker refers to a New York City rule that preduded a man and a woman from get-
ting married unless the woman wore a skirt or dress and the man wore a jacket and
tie or turtleneck A court refused to enjoin the rule, concluding that it was not of suf-
ficient importance for federal intervention. See Rappaport v. Katz, 380 F. Supp. 808
[Vol. 5:229
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gender policing of appearance perpetuates sexual harassment of
women at work by requiring women to display themselves in ways
which facilitate their objectification. 2'
Unfortunately, courts have held that- the mere fact that an em-
ployer imposes different rules for men's and women's appearances is
not enough to constitute liability under Title VII. One must show
that the rules for women are demeaning or constitute sexual harass-
ment to prevail under Title VII. 22 Colker argues that courts do not
often use Title VII to rid workplaces of gender differentiation because
they are not comfortable challenging rules that differentiate based on
gender.'
Rules promoting gender differentiation permeate society. Gender
hybrids, such as transsexuals, provide good information about gender
policing because they have lived in both ge'idered worlds. For the
gender police to be less effective, Colker asks her readers to be more
attentive to the gender differentiation in their own lives. 24 Colker also
insists that courts strip Tide VII of its moral code and let it reach out
to protect men and women from workplace sex discrimination or sex
differentiation, as well as to protect gender hybrids, like transsexuals,
who face explicit sex discrimination. 25 Applying a bi perspective would
undercut the assumption that biology is destiny and it would allow
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). Colker claims the Court's acceptance of traditional gendered dress
for weddings reinforces the heterosexual institution of marriage. See COLKER, supra
note 1, at 110.
21. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Plaintiff, Mar-
garet Hasselman, was a required to wear sexually revealing outfits as a lobby
attendant. As a result of her sexually revealing attire, Hasselman was subject to sexual
propositions as well as lewd comments and gestures. Hasselman ultimately prevailed
on a sexual harassment theory by showing a connection between mandated appear-
ance rules and sexual discrimination. See COLICKER, supra note 1, at 110-111.
22. See Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979)
(holding that it is demeaning for women to be required to wear uniforms while men
are only required to wear customary business attire); O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat
Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that it is de-
meaning for female sales clerks to be required to wear a "smock" and for male sales
clerks to be required to wear business attire consisting of pants, shirt, and a tie).
23. See COLER, supra note 1, at 111.
24. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 118.
25. Protection for gender hybrids under Title VII would help provide ameliorative treat-
ment, including the end of coercion to maintain an abandoned gender identity. See
COL CER, supra note 1, at 115.
1999]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
individuals to play with "mother nature," or at least question societal
gender roles assigned by biological sex.26
Colker's last chapter in Hybrid discusses the current controversy
concerning the United States Census, which illuminates the central
themes of her book.27 She examines the development of the Census
and how it artificially constructs objective measurements of complex
racial identities. The first United States Census, taken in 1780, in-
quired whether individuals were free white males over sixteen, free
white males under sixteen, free white females, all other free persons, or
slaves.2 8 Beginning in 1870, the Census tried to gather information
about free men of color by adding racial categories.2'9 Gradually, the
Census changed and added different racial categories, culminating in
Directive No. 15, issued in 1977, which provided for racial categories
used on all government recordkeeping 0
Fifteen racial options were used in the 1980 and 1990 Census.3
If individuals responding to the Census did not check one of the fif-
teen categories they could check the category of "other" and write in
their own racial classification. 2 However, the category of "other" has
never been a separate category because, when individuals write in their
26. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 91.
27. "The point of this book is not that we should abandon categories. A legal system
without categories is impossible, and a society without a legal system invites anarchy.
If one thing is dear about American society, it is that it always will be dependent
upon a legal system that relies heavily on categories." COLKER, supra note 1, at 233.
The United States Census, Colker argues, illustrates the main tenets of her book be-
cause of its necessary reliance on categories and the move to change some of those
categories to make them more representative of individuals.
28. The Constitution requires an enumeration of all "free Persons, including those bound
to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
other Persons." U.S. Const. art. 2, § 1.
29. See COLER, supra note 1, at 235 (quoting HmvtAN ALTERMAN, COUNTING PEOPLE:
THE CENSUS HisTORy IN HisToRY 276 (1969)). The 1870 racial categories included
"black" (for people of more than three-fourths African descent), "quadroon" (one-
quarter to three-eighths African descent), and "octoroon" (one-eighth or less of any
African descent). These determinations were made solely on the basis of personal ob-
servation; no questions were asked to the respondents concerning their race.
30. See CoLuR, supra note 1, at 236; see also Directive No. 15, 59 Fed. Reg. 29831
(1977).
31. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 237 (quoting Sharon M. Lee, Racial Classifications in the
US. Census: 1890-1990, 16 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 80 (1993)). The fifteen cate-
gories are white, black or Negro, Indian (American), Eskimo, Aleut, Asian-Pacific
Islander, Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, Asian Indian,
Samoan, and Guamanian.
32. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 237.
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own racial category under "other," their response is reassigned to one
of the listed racial classifications so that the Census respondents are
still classified as monoracial. Before 1980, a mixed-race person was
assigned the father's race; however since 1980, a mixed-race person is
assigned the mother's race."
A variety of rules governs how people who identify as multiracial
are classified under existing Census categories.3 The current proposal
to improve Directive No. 15 is to add a separate category of
"multiracial."" The controversial proposition to add a "multiracial"
category has been debated within African-American communities.
Some African-American organizations argue that since many blacks
who have been in the United States for several generations have some
white ancestry, a multiracial category could eradicate the monolithic
Census category of "black." 37 Other African-American organizations
that represent parents in multiracial marriages favor a multiracial cate-
gory." They base their multiracial identity not on a lineage of slave
masters' rape of black women but on consensual interracial marriages.
Parents in multiracial marriages may feel that they can better con-
struct their children's identities by identifying them as multiracial
instead of forcing them to choose one parent over the other in a
monoracial designation."
33. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 237.
34. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 83.
35. People who identify as biracial or multiracial are left in the "other" racial classifica-
tion. People who identify as "black-white" are designated as "black," while people
who identify as "white-black" are designated as "white". Lee, supra note 31, at 83-
84.
36. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 238-39.
37. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 241-42 (quoting Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Em-
powerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1995)).
Ramirez wrote:
Creating a multiracial category would dilute the statistical strength of es-
tablished minority groups. As the number of people claiming multiracial
identity increases, membership in existing minority groups would necessar-
ily decrease. The statistical change would have an enormous impact on
matters immensely important to minority communities: electoral repre-
sentation, the allocation of government benefits, affirmative action, and
federal contracting rules.
Ramirez, supra at 968.
38. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 243.
39. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 243 (citing Carlos Fernandez, President, Association of
MultiEthnic Americans, Congressional Hearing 127 (June 30, 1993)).
19991
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Notwithstanding the debate within African-American communi-
ties over a "multiracial" category, Colker points out that the problem
inherent in adding another racial category to the Census is that it still
may not accurately reflect an individual's racial identity. To overcome
this and other problems, Colker proposes asking three questions:
"1) What is your self-identity?; 2) If your self-identity is different than
your community identity, what is your community identity?; 3) What
are your countries of origin of your parents, to the extent that you are
aware of them?"40 Colker argues that these three questions, which call
for a separation of self-identity, community identity, and ancestry,
may allow for a recognition of people's multiracial backgrounds while
respecting self-identity and understanding the history of oppression.
These types of questions would allow for a movement towards a multi-
racial society.
41
Colker concludes Hybrid by arguing that separating out questions
of self-identity, community identity, and ancestry, can provide in-
sights not only for the United States Census, but also for other
categorization systems utilized for gender, sexual orientation, and dis-
ability.42 Her proposal challenges current legal standards, while still
supporting the idea of legal categories. Colker invites her readers to
support the transformation of existing legal categories while keeping
the concept of legal categorizations intact, because a legal system
without categories would invite anarchy.43
II: THE CURRENT DISCUSSION REGARDING BIsExuALITY
Within the past decade, the movement for social and political
recognition of bisexuality has grown and become increasingly visible.
The current bisexual community and movement, which began in the
mid-seventies, flourished in the early eighties with the organization of
social, support, and educational groups for bisexuals in major cities
and towns. Some of these groups included the Boston Bisexual
40. COLKER, supra note 1, at 243-45.
41. "When I read the testimony of parents in interracial marriages, I deeply understand
their desire to transform the society in which their children will grow up. They want
their children to share in the culture and heritage of both parents, and not to be
judged by the 'one drop of blood rule'. I hope that adding new categories to the cen-
sus will help in the achievement of that objective." COLKER, supra note 1, at 246.
42. See CoLKER, supra note 1, at 247.
43. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 32-36, 233.
[Vol. 5:229
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Women's Network, founded in 1983, and the East Coast Bisexual
Network, founded in 1985." With the social and political organization of
bisexuals came a growing body of literature with bisexuality as its focus.45
Two important anthologies were Bi Any Other Name: Bisexual People
Speak Out, and Closer to Home: Bisexuality and Feminism." In both an-
thologies, the writings rejected the notion that individuals had to
choose one sexuality. Instead, the two books gave a voice and a forum
to bisexuals attempting to redefine the world through their visions of
sexuality and identity while demanding to be accepted on their own
47
terms.
Like Colker, numerous writers in Bi Any Other Name and Closer to
Home acknowledge that the current definition of sexuality is based on
binary oppositions. 8 In advocating a bisexual theory, writers in the two
anthologies compare and contrast the current static definition of sexual-
ity, where women loving women excludes loving men and men loving
men excludes loving women, to a bisexually defined sexuality that does
not strive for stasis or consistency.49 Bisexuality is a sexuality, arguably,
that is not threatened by inclusion, but is inclusive in and of itself.
44. See Bi ANY OTHER NAME: BIsEXUAL PEOPLE SPEAx OUT 359-67 (Loraine Hutchins
and Lani Kaahumanu eds., 1991) [hereinafter Bi ANY OTHER NAME] (providing one
of the first histories of the bisexual movement).
45. See generally BIsEXUtAL LwEs (Off Pink Collective ed., 1988); BIsEXmTY: A READER
AND SOURCEBOOK (Thomas Geller ed., 1990); BIsEXUAL POLITICS: THEORIES, QUE-
RIas, & VISIONs (Naomi Tucker ed., 1995); BisExuAL s: THEORY AND RESEARCH
(Fritz Klein et al. eds., 1985); MARJORIE GARBER, VICE VERSA: BISEXUALIn AND THE
EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY LIFE (1995); CHARLOTrE WOLFF, BISEXUALrY: A STUDY
(1979).
46. Bi ANY OTHER NAME, supra note 44; CLOSER TO HOME: BIsExuALrT AND FEMINISM
(Elizabeth RebaWeise ed., 1992) [hereinafter CLOSERTO HOME].
47. See CLOSER To HOME, supra note 46, at xv.
48. See, e.g. Kathleen Bennett, Feminist Bisexuality: A Both/And Option for an Either/Or
World, in CLOSER To HOME, supra note 46, at 205; Brenda Marie Blasingame, The
Roots of Biphobia, in CLOSER To HOME, supra note 46, at 47; Margaret Mihee Choe,
Our Selves, Growing Whole, in CLOSER To HOME, supra note 46, at 22; Lucy Fried-
land and Liz A. Highleyman, The Fine Art of Labelling The Convergence of
Anarchism, Feminism, and Bisexuality, in BI ANY OTHER NAME, supra note 44, at
285; Ruth Gibian, Refusing Certainty: Toward a Bisexuality of Wholeness, in CLOSER
To HOME, supra note 46, at 5; Lisa Orlando, Loving Whom We Choose, in Bi ANY
OTHER NAME, supra note 44, at 223; Carol A. Queen, The Queer in Me, in Bi ANY
OTHER NAME, supra, note 44, at 17; Amanda Udis-Kessler, Closer To Home: Bisexual
Feminism and the Transformation of Hetero/Sexism, in CLOSER To HOME, supra note
46, at 183; Dvora Zipkin, Why Bi?, in CLOSER To HOME, supra note 46, at 55.
49. See e.g. Gibian, supra note 48, at 7. Ruth Gibian goes on to point out that bisexuality
does not annihilate differences but encourages them, because it is a sexuality that is
1999]
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Both books demonstrate the bisexual community's struggle to
conceptualize bisexuality and its ideological agenda. Part of the strug-
gle is over whether the bisexual movement should adopt a liberationist
ideology, like the black, women's, and gay and lesbian movements, or
if the bisexual movement should break with ideological and political
traditions to advance a radical ideology regarding gender and sexual-
ity.5" The difference in the two approaches can be likened to groups
with a liberationist agenda accepting the "pie" that constitutes the cur-
rent legal system and working towards acquiring a piece of that pie,
while other groups promoting a radical agenda do not like the pie that
is being offered and will work to transform that pie.
Colker's proposal to change the existing legal system by including
more categories is a decidedly liberationist approach through its ac-
ceptance of the status quo, contingent upon a few minor changes.
Many other bisexual writers in the two anthologies, particularly those
in Closer to Home who are writing from an explicitly feminist stand-
point, reject the liberationist approach Colker's book advocates."
These writers do not want a piece of the pie; instead, they want to
transform the pie that is being offered.52
The political struggle mirrors the complexity of bisexuality and
the multifaceted oppression of bisexuals. Before the bisexual commu-
nity can advocate for a specific legal system, bisexuals need to decide
who they are in order to describe the nature of their oppression. 53 In
looking towards a bisexual jurisprudence, it is important to under-
stand the foundations and assumptions upon which a jurisprudence
can be built. These foundations and assumptions strike at the'heart of
enigmatic identity questions facing bisexuals.54 Bisexuals can describe
not threatened by inclusion but becomes larger because of inclusion. "Desire itself
becomes multiplicitous. It does not try to stop the top; it is the top." Gibian, supra at
7.
50. See Paula Rust, Who Are We and Where Do We Go From Here? Conceptualizing Bi-
sexuality, in CLOSER TO HOME, supra note 46, at 281.
51. See CLOSER To HOME, supra note 46, at xi-xii.
52. See Rust, supra note 50, at 282.
53. See Rust, supra note 50, at 282.
54. "In short, our goals depend upon who we conceive ourselves to be. For bisexuals,
defining who we are is particularly problematic because according to current sexual
ideology we do not even exist, much less have an identity. By the same token, how-
ever, starting without a predetermined identity seems to allow us unlimited




their identity in a variety of ways. Some describe it as dichotomous. 55
This conceptualization of bisexuality, however, only serves to reinforce
the hegemonic heterosexual/homosexual split, ultimately denying an
independent and legitimate category of bisexuality.
56
Others conceive of bisexuality, and sexuality in general, as a
"continuum, spectrum, or continuous scale of sexuality" where the
lines are blurred between gay/lesbian, straight, and bisexual 7.5  This
approach to bisexuality, although more fluid, is still predicated upon a
binary approach to sexuality which places heterosexuality and homo-
sexuality at opposite ends of a continuum. These "poles" serve as a
constant reminder of the framework within which an individual's
sexuality is being evaluated.
A third approach to sexuality conceptualizes bisexuality as
"qualitatively different from heterosexuality and homosexuality," de-
fining bisexuality as a third and distinct category of sexuality.5s This
trichotomous approach to bisexuality validates all three categories as
legitimate and independent forms of sexual orientation. 9 A trichoto-
mous approach, however, still depends upon the dominant
heterosexual/homosexual paradigm through its acceptance of sexuality
as characterizable by categories through its addition of the category of
bisexuality.
Colker can be considered a "trichotomist" in her conceptualiza-
tion of bisexuality insofar as she adds bisexuality as a third component
of the already existing legal categories of sexual identity. What Colker
fails to recognize in her conceptualization of bisexuality is the influ-
ence her conceptualization has on the jurisprudence she is attempting
1
55. See Rust, supra note 50, at 289-90. Rust explains that a dichotomous conceptualiza-
tion of bisexuality can be described in two different ways. The first conceptualization
views sexuality as a dichotomy where "heterosexuality and homosexuality are dearly
distinct and exhaustive categories and bisexuality is nonexistent." The second con-
ceptualization also views sexuality as dichotomous, recognizing that bisexuality exists
but defining it as "a combination of heterosexuality and homosexuality."
56. Rust, supra note 50, at 293.
57. Rust, supra note 50, at 290. People "who endorse this model typically.. . draw lines
somewhere between straight, bisexual, and lesbian/gay... The location of these lines
varies: some ... define everyone as a bisexual except those who fall at the extreme
endpoints of the continuum, whereas others would call bisexual only those who fall at
the exact midpoint."
58. Rust, supra note 50, at 290.
59. People who view sexuality as trichotomous generally think of bisexuality as a third
form of sexuality. People define it this way by saying "I do believe that this category
exists legitimately" or "It's a valid orientation." Rust, supra note 50, at 291.
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to advance. Although Colker advocates for the existence of an inde-
pendent conceptualization of bisexuality, she still uses the
heterosexual/homosexual paradigm as the building tools for her juris-
prudence. Her trichotomist approach to sexuality will always be
situated within the dominant paradigm of heterosexuality and homo-
sexuality. Colker does not attempt to change the language
surrounding the discussion about sexuality because she is not asking
for systemic change, just systemic modification. Under Colker's ap-
proach, it would be impossible to describe a bisexual experience
without referencing either heterosexuality or homosexuality.
60
III: CRITIQUING COLKER
Colker's suggested jurisprudence relies too heavily on an identity
skepticism of the law, thereby failing to acknowledge the influence
that cultural transformation can have on the law. In addition, absent
from Colker's book is a legal skepticism regarding her bisexual juris-
prudence. Colker ignores nonlegal alternatives that could provide
liberation and cultural transformation where a tripolar approach to
legal identity categories cannot.
A. Identity Skepticism
Identity skeptics, while adopting legal approaches to remedy dis-
crimination, are critical of conventional identity categories, fearing
that the categories may undermine equality and create negative cul-
tural consequences for groups attempting to seek protection under
those laws. There are two major strands of identity skepticism: liberal
and critical. Liberal identity skeptics believe that universal principles
should guide equality theory. Universalism places the individual at the
center of social analysis. It recognizes a variety of individual differ-
ences but rejects group-based differences in favor of a universal
concept of humanity where group characteristics are unimportant.
61
60. Although Colker does conceptualize bisexuality as a form of sexuality distinct from
heterosexuality and homosexuality, she does not give a different cultural meaning to
the word or its context (which is the current legal system). Without these changes, bi-
sexuality will have to be referenced as one of the three "valid" forms of sexuality.
61. Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture, and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in Post-Civil
Rights Era, 110 HARv. L. REv. 684, 699 (1997) (book review).
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Critical identity skeptics, however, view traditional identity cate-
gories as insufficient in their ability to reflect the numerous group-
based identity characteristics. 2 Critical identity skeptics reject liberal
universalism, favoring an approach which emphasizes the influence
group-based differences have on individuals' lives and on society."
"Critical identity skeptics... make two principal claims: that identity
categories are born from inequality and ... reinforce inequality," and
that identity categories further reinforce inequality by their fixation on
a particularly categorized identity."
Critical identity skeptics are particularly concerned with equality
laws reproducing the social hierarchies from which they were created.65
Identity categories are constructed by those in a position of domi-
nance and, therefore, reflect the prevailing views of those in power,
who are rarely individuals from oppressed groups attempting to gain
anti-discrimination protection for themselves and others like them-
selves." Colker, while utilizing an identity-based categorical approach
to legal reforms, does not address these criticisms throughout her
book.
Colker also fails to address the irony of her criticism of the cur-
rent bipolar legal categories and her adoption of tripolar legal
categories. The addition of a third category of bisexuality to the cur-
rent legal system is strikingly similar to current bipolar legal categories
in that it approaches identity categories through group-based identity
characteristics constructed from the same patriarchal legal system that
created and perpetuated the bipolar categories.
Colker never challenges the existing power structure that created
bipolar categories, which would be the same power structure creating
and interpreting a third category. While Colker argues the advantages
of some individuals, including bisexuals, being better represented by a
third category, she does not address the inevitable essentialism that
will flow from such a third category. Colker's third category, though
offering a new option, would still reduce individual differences to an
unstated norm or paradigmatic type, therefore replicating the same
injustices Colker is attempting to remedy.
62. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 700.
63. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 700.
64. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 705.
65. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 705.
66. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 705.
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B. Legal Skepticism
Where identity skepticism focuses on the cultural consequences
of anti-discrimination law, legal skepticism focuses on cultural alter-
natives to legal measures. There are liberal and critical strands of legal
skepticism as well. A liberal approach promotes an individual's role
and responsibility in changing the world and looks principally to cul-
ture and civil society, not the law, to change social injustices. 67 Many
liberal legal skeptics want to limit the government's reach into the pri-
vate sphere, regardless of the extent of the injustice. Critical skeptics,
particularly those arguing for gay civil rights, focus on the power of
individual cultural assimilation by attempting to open up cultural in-
stitutions, such as marriage, to create equality for gay and lesbian
people.
68
Critical legal skeptics share with liberal legal skeptics a distrust of
the law to bring about significant social change. The two groups disa-
gree, however, on the question of culture. Liberal legal skeptics
advocate equality through individual assimilation into existing cultural
institutions, 9 while critical legal skeptics advocate a transformation of
culture or the "de-centering" of the law.7
Central to critical legal skeptics is the belief "that law cannot
autonomously effect fundamental social change." 7' Although many
critical legal skeptics advocate the passage of anti-discrimination laws,
they would supplement such laws by shifting the movement's focus to
cultural transformation.72 Critical legal skeptics believe that "the pro-
liferation of new and diverse representations of historically
67. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 709-11.
68. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 712.
69. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 713-14.
70. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 714-17; see also CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE
POWER OF LAW 5 (1989). Smart defines "de-centering" the law as:
By this I mean that it is important to think of non-legal strategies and to
discourage a resort to law as if it holds the key to unlock women's oppres-
sion. I include in this 'resort to law' not only matters of direct policy
proposals but also matters of scholarship.... I am not suggesting we can
simply abolish law, but we can resist the move towards more law and the
creeping hegemony of the legal order.
71. Schacter, supra note 61, at 715 (citingJohn 0. Calmore, CriticalRace Theory, Archie
Shepp, andFire Music, 65 S. CA. L. REv. 2129, 2206-07 (1992)).
72. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 714.
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marginalized groups" 3 would aid such a transformation. Critical legal
skeptics look to this strategy because of their belief that current cul-
tural representations shape societal views about subordinated groups,
and therefore constitute and support inequality.7 Subordination suf-
fered by marginalized groups stems from a variety of cultural sources,
including, but not limited to, political, legal, economic, sexual, racial,
and family systems. Changing cultural representations would change
the roots of knowledge, thereby changing social knowledge. This is
often called "oppositional cultural practice" which seeks to use self-
defined representations and ideas about oppressed groups, instead of
the dominant culture's representations and ideas about oppressed
groups.7 5 Law cannot stand outside of culture and independently
change it. Culture is the key to change because of the varied ways in
which it shapes what people know and believe.
76
Colker ignores the importance of cultural change and does not
attempt to explicitly advocate for nonlegal strategies. Instead, Colker
accepts current legal categories and advocates the addition of more
categories. She seems to assume that the addition of hybrid categories
will help to alleviate both legal and societal discrimination by providing
legal recognition, and therefore societal validation, of an individual's
identity.7 Colker makes no attempt to challenge prevailing cultural
representations of hybridized individuals apart from changes she ad-
vocates for the legal system. Throughout Hybrid, Colker simply seeks
to remedy bipolar injustices with a tripolar approach, relying on the
dominant power structure of the current legal system, rather than at-
tempting to challenge cultural constructions of identity.
IV. GOING BEYOND A BIsExuAL JURISPRUDENCE
Both identity skepticism and legal skepticism, rooted in vastly
different theoretical premises, offer provocative questions regarding
how an identity-based jurisprudence, like a bisexual jurisprudence,
should be constructed. Both skeptics, albeit for different reasons, regard
73. Schacter, supra, note 61, at 716.
74. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 716.
75. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 717 (quoting John 0. Calmore, Critical Race Theory,
ArchieShepp, and Fire Music, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2205 (1992)).
76. See Schacter, supra note 61, at 717.
77. See COLKER, supra note 1, at 6-8.
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identity categories as problematic, with arguments over cultural con-
sequences grounding the debates. Both skeptics seek the same result:
liberation and equality for oppressed groups. Colker shares this goal in
her identity-based approach to solving inequality.
However, Colker cannot reach her goal without advocating for
cultural change while simultaneously advocating for legal change.
Without cultural change, Colker's new categories are likely to repro-
duce the patriarchal system from which they were created. Adding
new categories simply masks the root of the inequality, which is a pa-
triarchal system perpetuating the dominance of one group over
another through binary approaches to group-based identity. The ad-
dition of a third category will not shift power from the dominant
group, and equality efforts will be undermined unless cultural change
occurs.
Some legal and cultural critics have attempted to create a juris-
prudence known as Queer jurisprudence8 to achieve the goals of
liberation and equality for oppressed groups. A Queer jurisprudence
has several goals. The first goal is ensuring the survival, and success, of
sexual minorities under the current rule of law. The second goal is to
make sexual minorities visible to the law by weaving the experiences of
78. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Confla-
tion of 'Sex," "Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society,
83 CAL. L. Rxv. 3, 347 (1995) [hereinafter Valdes, Queers].
'Queer,' as a reclaimed and reconceptualized term, therefore seems to best
capture the past, present, and future of sexual minority identities, persons,
and lives: that it reminds us of a past never to be repeated is a painful but
salutary effect; that it brings to mind how women and people of color have
been ignored (even) by white gay men is a needed reminder; that it evokes
at once the progress we have made, and the progress we have yet to make,
has an inspiring yet tempering effect; that it combines history with hopes
creates a constructive tension that should charge Queer theorizing for some
time to come. Ideally, Queer critiques can and should benefit from this
mixture of horrible history and high hope.
Valdes, Queers, supra at 349.
For examples of Queer jurisprudence, see Marc A. Fajer, Can Two RealMen Eat
Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians
and Gay Men, 46 U. MrAMI L. Ray. 511 (1992); Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersec-
tionality and the Failure of Recent Lesbian and Gay 'Victories, 4 LAW AND SEXUALTY
83 (1994); Carl Stychin Inside and Out of the Military, 3 LAw AND SEXUALiTY 27
(1993); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture, 5 S. CAL. Rpy. Lw &
WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Cri-
tique ofPosner's Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gay LegalAgenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333
(1992) (reviewing RicHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992)).
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sexual minorities as sexual minorities into the law's fabric. This is an
attempt to make the law more responsible and accountable to sexual
minorities as sexual minorities. A third goal of a Queer jurisprudence
is to inform and reform a legal culture content to neglect and ignore
the rights of sexual minorities.79
A Queer jurisprudence would attempt to reform the current legal
culture through its deconstruction and subsequent reconstruction.
Deconstruction would ask the legal culture as a whole to recognize the
shortcomings and costs of the status quo, the benefits of legal reform,
and the need to invest in effective reformatory efforts aimed at
changing the current legal culture.80 However, a Queer jurisprudence
does not necessarily call for, or depend on, the creation and enactment
of new rules and laws. Instead, a Queer jurisprudence strives to recre-
ate the status quo on existing doctrine.8' To distinguish itself from the
status quo, a Queer jurisprudence insists on two types of analysis to be
used during reconstruction. The first type of analysis insists on in-
formed and principled applications of existing rules. The second type
of analysis also insists on informed and principled applications of ex-
isting rules regarding established legal and cultural conceptions of sex,
gender, and sexual orientation. The additional goal of this second type
of analysis is to make the law conform with reality in ways that actu-
ally help to check the entire range of sex and gender discrimination.82
Although a Queer jurisprudence, as described above, would
attempt to change the legal system in order to create more equality,
and ultimately liberation, for oppressed groups, the jurisprudence
does not attempt to do so outside of the current rule of law. Instead,
much like Colker's bisexual jurisprudence, Queer jurisprudence,
which attempts to improve the status of oppressed groups within the
current legal system, not only reinforces the current and oppressive
system, but also reinforces the hegemony of the current legal order.
Queer jurisprudence attempts not to move away from the law, but
rather to embrace it. Cultural change for minority groups, particularly
sexual minority groups, is seen as a benefit stemming from legal
change, rather than as a goal in and of itself. Like Colker's bisexual
jurisprudence,. Queer jurisprudence cannot meet its goals of equality
79. SeeValdes, Queers, supra note 78, at 361.
80. See Valdes, Queers, supra note 78, at 203-04.
81. See Valdes, Queers, supra note 78, at 303.
82. See Valdes, Queers, supra note 78, at 304.
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and liberation for oppressed groups without advocating for cultural
change independent of legal change.
Changing dominant cultural understandings is a formidable task
which I do not attempt to address. What I offer is a more radical and
transformative approach which seeks to universalize human sexuality,
while also leaving room for individual identities. It is an approach,
labeled by some theorists as "pansensuality," that attempts to attack
legally prescribed sexual identity categories at a conceptual level by
encompassing all sexual experiences and identities that do not fit into
the dominant heterosexual/homosexual paradigm. 3 Although Colker's
conceptualization of bisexuality as a category qualitatively different
from heterosexuality and homosexuality may be the best of the three
approaches in asserting the existence and legitimacy of bisexuality, her
refusal to advocate cultural change differentiates her from many bi-
sexual writers and theorists, particularly feminist-identified bisexuals.
The word bisexual itself is dualistic because it implies that bisexuals
are two halves instead of a whole.8" Bisexual writers and theorists argue
for a new name which would emphasize holism and freedom over so-cieta . . 85
cietal restrictions. One writer in particular, Paula Rust, chooses the
term "pansensual," meaning "all-sensual." Rust argues that the term
"pansensual" would adequately refer to a bisexual's experiences by its
"all-sensual" definition, while also rejecting the notion of "sex" in
choosing "pansensual" over "pansexual," which eliminates the implied
reference of terms like heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality
to the sex/gender of the partner." Rust further argues that pansensu-
ality would allow a distinction between pansensuals, heterosexuals,
and homosexuals, thus allowing pansensuals to determine their own
sexual identities by the terms they set for themselves, instead of the
83. See Rust, supra note 50.
84. The word bisexual also overemphasizes biology as the linchpin of attraction.
"The term 'bisexual,' however, embodies the negative definition of our-
selves just discussed: the emphasis remains upon the biological sex
characteristics of potential romantic partners. Although we argue that we
do not choose our partners based upon their biological sex, we still define
ourselves with a word that refers to the biological sex of our partners. This
is self-defeating; what we need to do instead is to remove the characteristic
of partner sex from its privileged position altogether so that we are free to
choose our own ways of defining ourselves and choosing our partners."
Rust, supra note 50, at 299.
85. See Rust, supra note 50, at 299-01.
86. See Rust, supra note 50, at 300-01.
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terms dictated by the dominant sexual culture." Rust wants to trans-
form sexual culture and society, not assimilate into the prevailing
culture.
A pansensual jurisprudence would attempt to "de-center" law by
not seeking legal solutions to inequality. This would serve to decon-
struct the law, instead of fetishizing the law as the sole source of truth
and justice, as Colker has done with her bisexual jurisprudence." Such
a deconstruction would call into question current truths regarding
sexuality and sexual identity and "the need'for such truths and dog-
matic certainties," instead of adding to existing hierarchies of
knowledge established through dominant cultural and legal construc-
tions.8 9
A pansensual jurisprudence begins by asking if the recognition of
bisexuality would sufficiently challenge the heterosexual/homosexual
paradigm to produce liberation. This Review's critique of Colker's
vision of a bisexual jurisprudence suggests that it would not. For
liberation and sexual freedom to occur, one must look beyond the
addition of a third category of bisexuality to a more encompassing
jurisprudence of sexuality. A pansensual jurisprudence would dissent
from the dominant construction of sexuality by its inclusion of
individuals not aligned on the heterosexual/homosexual/bisexual
poles, while advocating an all-encompassing "pansensuality."9 °
A pansensual jurisprudence would present a four-part challenge
to the current legal system through its focus on changing cultural rep-
resentations of those individuals whom the dominant culture has
deemed to be homosexual or heterosexual. First, it would challenge
the societal emphasis placed on biological sex, particularly as a deter-
minant of one's sexual identity. The biological sex of a partner would
no longer indicate one's sexual preference. Instead, the option to con-
sciously choose a set of criteria, where one's biological sex may be one
criteria among many, would be emphasized. Second, it would chal-
lenge the prevailing assumption that people are either heterosexual,
homosexual, or in Colker's conception, bisexual. Specific labels would
not be necessary under a pansensual jurisprudence where sexual identity
poles do not exist. Third, it would broaden the concept of sexuality by
its inclusivity, as well as by its notion of a sensuality separate and apart
87. See Rust, supra note 50, at 301.
88. See SMtART, supra note 70, at 88-89.
89. See SMuART, supra note 70, at 71.
90. See Rust, supra note 50, at 300-01.
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from the current construction of sexuality. Fourth, it would challenge
the prevailing power structure by subverting the dominant paradigm
of heterosexuality and homosexuality."'
A pansensual jurisprudence would change identity categories and
meanings by changing cultural representations of gender and sexuality
through increased visibility. New, self-defined representations of indi-
viduals' sexuality will make it possible for new ideas to take root
amidst-the dominant culture's representations of sexuality. For a pan-
sensual jurisprudence to 'be visible, doubt needs to exist as to the
universality of defining sexuality as either heterosexual or homosexual.
A pansensual jurisprudence would cause individuals to begin to ques-
tion whether one's sexuality can be defined based on current
observations of their partner's biological sex. If not, then perceptions
of a pansensual jurisprudence will become accessible. The need for
sexual poles will no longer exist when the dominant cultural meanings
of sexuality and sexual identities are transformed."
This vision of a pansensual jurisprudence transforming culture
sharply contrasts with the finite vision offered by Colker, which exists
within the structured and controlled realm of the legal system. Al-
though the addition of a third category of bisexuality may allow
individuals to consider whether a person fits one of three categorizable
sexual identities, there will still only be finite choices offered under a
tripolar system where neither freedom nor liberation are goals. Adding
another category within which individuals must fit, in order to con-
form to societal expectations, will not transform culture. Instead, the
third category will be subsumed into the existing culture of those who
91. These four challenges have been articulated by Paula Rust. See Rust, supra note 50, at
304.
92. Rust uses the following analogy to describe a shift from current cultural understand-
ings of sexuality to a new understanding of pansensuality:
If the edifice constructed atop biological sex continues to stand, so be it.
This edifice has many inhabitants, and they like the shelter they have
found. Meanwhile, however, we can build our own house. Our house may
be small at first, but as we continue to gather up the bricks that have fallen
out of the original edifice, it will grow larger. As it grows larger, it will be-
come more visible. Those original inhabitants of the original edifice who
are not happy with their current accommodations may move into our new
house. We do not need to destroy it in order to begin to make its inhabi-
tants aware of the new house being constructed next door. When they look
out the window, they will see it. We become visible.
Rust, supra note 50, at 304-05.
[Vol. 5:229
BISEXUAL JURISPRUDENCE
are legally categorized and recognizable, and therefore societally vali-
dated, and those who are not.
Although both approaches, legal and cultural, may aid each other
in pushing the bounds of categories and cultural understandings of
sexuality, their goals are vastly different. Colker is using and sub-
scribing to finite categories and boundaries, whereas pansensual
jurisprudence seeks to offer infinite conceptualizations of sexuality
and sensuality, while seeking to eradicate boundaries. Put another
way, Colker is offering the same pie, except that she wants to divide it
into smaller pieces, whereas a pansensual jurisprudence seeks to
transform the pie by transforming culture.
The advancement of a pansensual jurisprudence does, however, beg
certain questions as to its consequences. A pansensual jurisprudence pre-
sents a paradox for identity politics. On the one hand, a pansensual
jurisprudence seems to be offering an identity, albeit a large and
somewhat elusive identity as an individual who is "queer," which will
have different meanings for different individuals. On the other hand,
a pansensual jurisprudence rejects identity politics by abolishing the
need to identify around narrow categories, such as bisexuality. Would
sexual identity even exist under this type of jurisprudence? For an
identity to exist, does it always need to be defined in relation to
something else, thereby always creating the "other"? The questions
produced by a pansensual jurisprudence are provocative and elusive at
best.
What a pansensual jurisprudence could do, that a bisexual juris-
prudence cannot, is push the current legal and cultural boundaries
imposed on sexuality by the dominant culture. While Colker's juris-
prudence works within the legal and cultural system to create change,
a pansensual jurisprudence would work outside of the legal and cul-
tural system to create change. A pansensual jurisprudence would go
beyond the dominant power structure by creating a new lens which
would view sexuality without the imposition of artificial dichotomies
and narrow limits on individual sexual experiences. Such a lens would
change the overall power structure, of which the law is an important
cornerstone, by radically altering the ways in which society conceives
of gender, sexuality, and power. These new conceptions of gender,
sexuality, and power would reshape what people know and believe
about subordinated groups, thereby changing the roots of knowledge
that created inequality to roots of knowledge that create equality. The
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radical approach of a pansensual jurisprudence would attempt to re-
construct a culture where sexual freedom and liberty are the norm. t
